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Contract doctrine with respect to remedies is straightforward. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts describes the "expectation interest" as the
benefit of a bargain that situates a promisee in the position of the anticipated
performance.' From this position, the Restatement goes on to describe the remedy
for breach of contract: "[T]he injured party has a right to damages based on his
expectation interest .... 2 Treatise writers have long agreed that an aggrieved
party is entitled to compensation for any abridgement of the promised state of
affairs.3 However, the straightforward notion of compensation for expectation
* Professor of Law, Regent University School of Law. J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School,1980.
M.A., Reformed Theological Seminary, 1997. Thanks for assistance with this piece are rightfully due to many,
including the Regent University School of Law and the American Center for Law and Justice for their financial
support, colleagues Tom Folsom, Mike Hernandez, and Craig Stern for their valuable insights, and Bethany
Den Boer for her editorial assistance. I also wish to thank the organizers and participants of the Fourth
International Conference on Contracts for giving me an opportunity to present an earlier version of this article.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981). The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
likewise protects the aggrieved party's expectation interest. U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (2001) ("The remedies provided
by [the Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be
put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed ... .
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347.
3. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 564
(5th ed. 2003) ("For breach of contract, the law of damages seeks to place the aggrieved party in the same
economic position the aggrieved party would have attained if the contract had been performed."); SAMUEL
WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 2392 (1920) ("In fixing the amount of these damages, the general
purpose of the law is, and should be, to give compensation:-that is, to put the plaintiff in as good a position as
he would have been in had the defendant kept his contract."); JOSEPH CHITTY, JR., A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 341 (1826) ("[T]he measure of damages was, not the mere difference in price between
the two kinds of goods, but the amount of the [consequential] damages and costs recovered in the action against
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belies the many, and contradictory, efforts to explain it. In the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, common law courts and writers alike described the legally
protected interest of an aggrieved party in terms of expectation. The civil law
tradition concurred.4 Still, no one theorized about why the law should vindicate
the aggrieved party's expectation rather than, say, the losses occasioned by the
breach.
The principle of measuring damages by the value of the unrealized
expectation remained largely unexamined until 1936.' Beginning in the 1960s,
academics have worked hard to explain what justifies the expectation measure of
contract damages.6 Parts I and II of this Article review the origins and
development of efforts to justify the expectation measure. Over the past thirty
years, those efforts have fallen into two broad categories-autonomy and
utility-paralleling two of the leading contemporary schools of ethics] However,
the compatibility and the commensurability of these efforts have not been clear.
Thus, in Part III, I review and criticize the efforts of scholars in the past decade to
ground utility in autonomy through the insights of John Rawls and other
contractualist thinkers. Finally, in Part IV, I outline my theory of principled
pluralism, by which I suggest a unitary justification of autonomy and utility.
Because I ground this justification with an appeal to a transcendent order, I also
anticipate some concerns about the legitimacy of such a theory in a pluralistic,
secular polity.
I. EARLY ANALYSIS OF THE EXPECTATION INTEREST
The dogmatic slumber of the law's standard recognition of expectation as the
measure of the remedy for breach of contract was shattered in 1936. In that year,
L.L. Fuller and William Perdue published their critique of the nonchalance of the
common law's vindication of the promisee's expectation.8 Characterizing
the plaintiff."); JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS 2 (1809) ("In
adjudging on contracts, therefore, respect ought first to be had to carry into execution the specific thing agreed
for, if that can possibly be obtained; and if the specific thing contracted for cannot be obtained, then a sufficient
equivalent.").
4. See, e.g., C. civ. art. 1149 (Fr.) ("Damages due to a creditor are, as a rule, for the loss which he has
suffered and the profit which he has been deprived of .. "); BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code]
§ 280, 1, sentence 1 ("If the obligor breaches a duty arising from the obligation, the obligee may demand
damages for the damage caused thereby."); id. § 249, 1 ("A person who is liable in damages must restore the
position that would exist if the circumstances obliging him to pay damages had not occurred."). Thus, under
German law, the crucial question is in what condition the aggrieved party would be but for the breach. If the
purpose of the contract would have been fulfilled but for the breach, the aggrieved party receives expectation
damages.
5. See infra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part 11.
7. See generally Alan Donagan, Twentieth-Century Anglo-American Ethics, in A HISTORY OF WESTERN
ETHICS 142 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 1992).
8. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52
(1936).
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expectation damages as an award for something that never existed (i.e., a "queer
kind of 'compensation"'), Fuller and Perdue challenged the common law's
reification of the expectation interest. 9 Drawing on the Aristotelian notion of the
virtue of justice as compensation for something that has been lost, Fuller and
Perdue believed that compensation for no more than expenditures made in
reliance on a promise would maintain "an equilibrium of goods among members
of society."' They went on to assert that an award for a promisee's disappointed
expectation represented something more:
In passing from compensation for change of position to compensation for
loss of expectancy we pass, to use Aristotle's terms again, from the realm
of corrective justice to that of distributive justice. The law no longer
seeks merely to heal a disturbed status quo, but to bring into being a new
situation."
Characterizing the expectation measure of contract damages as distributive
justice deeply subverted the commonplace understanding of contracts as private
law.' 2 The role of the civil authority in vindicating matters of corrective justice
seems self-evident. Under virtually any political theory, a purpose of the state is
to guard against individual, involuntary redistribution of property. Matters of
distributive justice, however, require a public law justification," which had never
been provided for expectation damages.
Rather than explaining why there is a public interest in taking wealth from
one private contract party and giving it to another, Fuller and Perdue tried to
develop a theory of expectation that would be consistent with the private
character of contract law. Fuller and Perdue began their search for a justification
for the expectation measure of damages by considering and quickly rejecting a
number of common reasons why the law should measure loss by expectation.
4
9. Id. at 53.
10. Id. at 56.
I1. Id.
12. See Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS
118, 122 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) ("Fuller's characterization of the expectation interest in terms of distributive
justice directly challenges the traditional understanding. For traditionally it was always supposed ... that
contract law, like other parts of private law, comes under corrective justice ....").
13. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 109-14 (J. A. Ackrill & J. 0. Urmson eds., David
Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1925) (asserting that the ratio by which things are distributed among
people requires public judgment as to merit).
14. First, the disappointed promisee's psychological sense of injury was deemed insufficient because the
law hardly awards damages for all such feelings of loss. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 58 ("[T]hough it
may be assumed that the impulse to assuage disappointment is one shared by those who make and influence the
law, this impulse can hardly be regarded as the key which solves the whole problem of the protection accorded
by the law to the expectation interest."). That the law awards expectation in some cases (bargained-for
exchanges) but not in others (gratuitous unrelied-upon promises) demonstrates that something other than the
promisee's sense of loss is at its root. For similar reasons, it would seem, Fuller and Perdue would have rejected
a duty-based explanation for the expectation interest. Because the law does not vindicate donative promises, the
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Anticipating the insights of neo-classical economics, Fuller and Perdue
ultimately considered the utility of judicial vindication of the expectation interest.
They recognized that market capitalism had for some time treated the contractual
expectation as a sort of property,' 5 and the commodification of the expectation
interest had obviously contributed greatly to the modem form of economic life.
They further acknowledged that participants in an economy based on credit come
to understand that that which the promisee believes to have value is valuable.16 In
other words, the psychology of anticipation becomes the economy of
expectation. 17 The economic value of expectation was not "property" before the
law recognized it, but neither did the law vindicate the expectation interest before
the market economy first developed. Embedded as they were in an academic
tradition of Legal Realism and the current New Deal approach to state
intervention in the economy, Fuller and Perdue did not offer any further
justification for the authority of the civil government to engage in economic
engineering. The value of increasing economic production was assumed, and the
authority of the law to encourage it remained unquestioned.
II. EXPECTATION UNDER THE MICROSCOPE
Since Fuller and Perdue's article, legal scholars have expended enormous
efforts to refine an answer to the fundamental question: why expectation?
Various theories have been proposed. First, in keeping with the root of the word
"remedy," theories in the deontological tradition" are backward-looking' 9 and
moral duty to keep self-imposed promissory obligations cannot be the justification for the legal remedy of
expectation damages. Secondly, while the concept of contract as private law may explain why the courts have
recognized breach of duty as a legal wrong, it cannot explain the expectation measure of damages. Most
contracts do not expressly provide for the remedy of expectation damages or, for that matter, any remedy at all
(and even when they do, courts critically scrutinize such liquidated damages provisions).
15. Id. at 59 ("In a society in which credit has become a significant and pervasive institution, it is
inevitable that the expectancy created by an enforceable promise should be regarded as a kind of property, and
breach of the promise as an injury to that property.").
16. Id. ("The essence of a credit economy lies in the fact that it tends to eliminate the distinction
between present and future (promised) goods. Expectations of future values become, for purposes of trade,
present values.").
17. Ultimately, even this was not enough to justify the law's vindication of the expectation interest for
Fuller and Perdue. From their perspective, it was the law's protection of the expectation that created the
economic utility of reification, not vice versa: "A promise has present value, why? Because the law enforces it.
'The expectancy,' regarded as a present value, is not the cause of legal intervention but the consequence of it."
Id. at 59-60. Fuller and Perdue believed instead that vindication of the expectation interest was the horse before
the cart of market capitalism.
18. See Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological (on
file with the McGeorge Low Review).
On deontological accounts of morality, agents cannot make certain wrongful choices even if by
doing so the number of wrongful choices will be minimized (because other agents will be prevented
from engaging in similar wrongful choices). For deontologists, what makes a choice right is its
conformity with a moral norm. Such norms are to be simply obeyed by each moral agent; such
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presuppose duty at their core. 20 Remedies are understood to repair an injury; in
contracts, loss caused by the failure of one party to do what was promised.
Various duty-oriented theories of contract emphasize different foundations,' but
none explicitly draw on a transcendent justification for that duty. In any event,
under deontological theories, contract remedies are a matter of right.
The leading alternative contemporary approach to contract remedies is
forward-looking and provides analytic rigor to Fuller and Perdue's principal
argument in favor of expectation. Vindicating the expectation interest is a means
to the end of facilitating efficient economic relations.22 In other words, remedies
are justified because they are useful; remedies are useful because they create
incentives for parties to behave more efficiently;23 and efficiency is to be pursued
because it promotes human welfare.24 The range of behaviors that remedies can
modify varies from the decision to perform or breach, to the myriad of pre-
performance decisions the promisee may make in reliance on a promise. But
from all points of the contracting process, efficiency emphasizes evaluating the
efficiency of particular rules.
A. Duty-Based Justification of the Expectation Measure
Any deontological approach to contract remedies must maintain that there
are fundamental ethical norms that constrain the pursuit of good consequences,
norm-keepings are not to be maximized by each agent. In this sense, for deontologists, the Right has
priority over the Good. If an act is not in accord with the Right, it may not be undertaken, no matter
the Good that it might produce (including even a Good consisting of acts in accordance with the
Right).
Id.
19. Contract writers have long thematized contractual remedies as repairs to a wrong. See generally A.
W. B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 LAW Q. REV. 247, 254 (1975) (noting that
early contracts treatises did not theorize about law because of "the close connection between private law and
certain moral ideas which have remained relatively static over long periods"). The "moral ideas" that Simpson
notes were grounded in canon law and, behind that, biblical morality. Id. at 251.
20. See Alexander & Moore, supra note 18 ("The word deontology derives from the Greek words for
duty (deon) and science (or study) of (logos).").
21. Typically, human freedom or a natural right of property. Compare STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT
THEORY (2004) (emphasizing human freedom), with Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 270 (1986) (describing contract law in terms of a transfer of a right).
22. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 103 (5th ed. 1998) ("[Tlhe
fundamental function of contract law . . . is to deter people from behaving opportunistically toward their
contracting parties, in order to encourage the optimal timing of economic activity .... ").
23. See Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in THE THEORY OF
CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS, supra note 12, at 19 ("[Economic theory] treats enforcement as altering the
parties' incentives, by changing the relevant payoffs from those the parties would face in the absence of an
enforceable obligation .... [E]nforcing the promise is efficient just in case the new set of incentives is, on
balance, efficient.").
24. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 22, at 3-4 (defining economic analysis of law as an exploration of "the
implications of assuming man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life").
25. See generally Craswell, supra note 23, at 28-32.
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however "good" is defined. Duty, rather than results, is the metric of
deontological ethics. Consequences, therefore, cannot determine the ethical rule.26
A deontological approach must then translate ethics into law. The latter effort has
proved to be a difficult task.
Charles Fried is the best-known proponent of equating the goal of contract
law with the ethical duty of promise-keeping." In Contract as Promise,z Fried
draws on the Kantian insight of the categorical imperative, asserting that:
The moralist of duty ... sees promising as a device that free, moral
individuals have fashioned on the premise of mutual trust, and which
gathers its moral force from that premise. The moralist of duty thus
posits a general obligation to keep promises, of which the obligation of
contract will be only a special case .... 9
According to Fried, because human beings are embedded in time, they cannot
presently act freely in the future. To maximize one's temporally limited freedom,
one may promise to do something for someone else in the future in return for a
present benefit or comparable promise. Keeping promises about one's actions in
the future thus has the paradoxical effect of increasing one's freedom in the
present. In Fried's view, it is ultimately the duty of promise-keeping, rather than
the contingent consequences of wealth maximization, that justifies contract law.3"
The Right has primacy over the Good.
The problem confronting the deontological theorists' approach to contract
law is their failure to deliver convincing explanations-or even persuasive
criticisms-of many existing contract rules. Duty may justify contract formation
rules but not much more. In other words, increasing individual autonomy by
rigorously enforcing promises may justify why an abstract regime of state-
sanctioned rules for contracts is justified or at least warranted.3' But legal
recognition of the moral duty to keep promises gives, at best, only a hint of what
26. See Alexander & Moore, supra note 18.
27. See DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 7
(2003) ("[Charles Fried's] Contract as Promise is the most celebrated and probably the most influential modem
defence of a thesis by that name .... ").
28. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981).
29. Id. at 17.
30. See Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?: A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 563, 578-79 (1980). In other words, Pareto efficiency requires actual unanimous consent to wealth
maximization, not hypothetical implied consent as asserted by Richard Posner in Richard A. Posner, The
Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Low Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 495
(1980). Cf. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, at v (1993) ("[Miuch law and
economic scholarship is far too unself-critical in assuming that particular normative values are or ought to be
vindicated by the law of contracts .... "). See generally SMITH, supra note 21, at 126-36 (summarizing moral
and transparency criticisms of efficiency theories of contract law).
31. But see C. Scott Pryor, Consideration in the Common Law of Contracts: A Biblical-Theological
Critique, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 26-29 (2005) (discussing ethical incoherence of categorical freedom of the
will).
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any specific rules (like expectation damages) should look like.32 Should a duty-
based justification for contract remedies demand performance at all costs, permit
substitutionary compensation, or rely on only moral opprobrium as a remedy for
breach? A leading duty theorist, Stephen A. Smith, has simply punted: "[T]he
rules regarding remedies for breach of contract are [not] a part of 'contract' law,
strictly speaking. 33 On the other hand, Seana Shiffrin, another deontological
academic, strongly criticizes the law for not regularly remedying contract
breaches by ordering performance but instead permitting monetary compensation
at the breacher's option.34 Aditi Bagchi is also concerned that any coercive
sanctions for failure to keep a promise undermine the very morality of promise-
keeping.35 In short, duty has proved to be a weak reed on which to justify judicial
protection of the expectation interest.
B. Consequentialist Explanations for the Expectation Measure
The raft of expositions as to the welfare-enhancing nature of the expectation
measure of damages testifies to the dominance of this legal theory.36
Consequentialism, as an ethical theory, seeks to justify rules by their results: the
Good precedes the Right.37 And the consequence sought to be advanced in most
32. But see KIMEL, supra note 27, at 93 (arguing that expectation damages do a better job protecting
entitlement created by contract than other measures).
33. SMITH, supra note 21, at 388. Smith does not leave the justification of remedies unmentioned. When
he gets to remedies, he turns to corrective justice to explain why compensation for breach of contract is
appropriate:
The general idea underlying corrective justice is that individuals have a duty to repair or
"correct" wrongful losses they have caused. What counts as wrongful is not specified by the concept
of corrective justice; corrective justice is meant to explain (secondary) duties to repair rather than
(primary) duties not to cause wrongful losses. Primary duties must be explained on other grounds.
Id. at 392; see also Benson, supra note 12, at 125 (limiting duty-based theory of contract law to an intra-
systemic account, eschewing consideration of foundational justification).
34. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 722
(2007).
[A] promisor is morally expected to keep her promise through performance. Absent the consent of
the promisee, the moral requirement would not be satisfied if the promisor merely supplied the
financial equivalent of what was promised .... If contract law ran parallel to morality, then contract
law would ... require that promisors keep their promise as opposed merely to paying off their
promises.
Id.
35. See Aditi Bagchi, Contract v. Promise, SCHOLARSHIP PA. L., Paper 176, at 2 (2007), available at
http:/Asr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1180&context=upenn/wps ("Contractual obligation is then
thought to reinforce promissory obligation. To the contrary, those private promises which are given the status of
contract are not thereby elevated .... A promise marked as contractual actually loses (at least some of) its
promissory quality."). Dori Kimel makes a similar, if less extravagant, point when he observes that between
persons sharing an on-going personal relationship "the insistence on a contract can ... be offensive." KIMEL,
supra note 27, at 56. In the more typical contracting situation, however, the desire for an enforceable contract
would not be out of place. Id.
36. See Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303 (2005).
37. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
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accounts of contract remedies is efficiency.38 Justification of compensation for
injury to the expectation interest tracks what Fuller and Perdue wrote over
seventy years ago: Protection of the expectation interest makes possible a
flourishing market economy.3 9 Some forty years later, the authors of The
Economics of Contract Law 4° were among the first to apply rigorous economic
reasoning to the issue. These early law and economics scholars focused on the
efficiency of performing contractual obligations.4' On the one hand, they
concluded that at least some legal sanctions for nonperformance were necessary
to sustain the welfare-increasing apparatus of contracting due to the twin dangers
of party opportunism and the occurrence of unanticipated contingencies.42 On the
other hand, excessive legal sanctions might diminish the efficient result. 3
Measuring recovery by the expectation interest would, they concluded, do the
trick by giving an incentive to perform," but not so much of an incentive as to
compel performance when inefficient.45 More recent "second generation"
economic analyses have focused less on the narrow decision of whether to
perform or breach, and more on the host of other incentives that can be affected
by the choice of contract remedies. The efficiency of contracting parties' interim
reliance on contractual obligations-that is, the nature and extent of actions taken
or forborne by a party prior to the time the other's performance is due-is also
affected by the remedy afforded and its measure. 6 Moreover, contract remedies
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) ("Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on consequences
(as opposed to the circumstances or the intrinsic nature of the act or anything that happens before the act).").
38. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 23, at 21 ("[T]he hallmark of this class of theories is simply that they
rest the case for enforcing a promise on some method of assessing the efficiency of the promised actions-as
opposed, say, to some deontological commitment that did not depend upon the effects on individual welfare.").
39. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
40. THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner eds., 1979).
41. See Craswell, supra note 23, at 22 ("[T]he modern economic analysis began in the early 1970s, with
articles that did indeed focus on the efficiency of the promised actions.").
42. What might in an alternate vocabulary be called the results of sin and effects of providence.
43. Specifically, it might diminish the ability of the parties to utilize "efficient breach." See POSNER,
supra note 22, at 103 ("[Tlhe fundamental function of contract law ... is to... encourage the optimal timing of
economic activity and ... obviate costly self-protective measures.").
44. Id. at 132 ("Usually the objective of giving the promisor an incentive to fulfill his promise unless the
result would be an inefficient use of resources ... can be achieved by giving the promisee his expected profit on
the transaction.").
45. Id. at 133.
[11n some cases a party is tempted to break his contract simply because his profit from breach would
exceed his profit from completion of the contract. If it would also exceed the expected profit to the
other party from completion of the contract, and if damages are limited to the loss of that profit,
there will be an incentive to commit a breach. But there should be.
Id.
46. See Craswell, supra note 23, at 29.
[M]aking A's promise enforceable will increase B's incentive to rely in one respect, since
enforceability will usually increase the probability that A will perform .... But the exact effect on
B's reliance incentives may depend not only on enforceability vel non, but also on the exact nature of
the enforceability, including the measure of damages B will collect if A fails to perform.
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even influence pre-performance actions, such as a party's precautions to guard
against the possibility of breach. 7
The increasing breadth of issues related to contract remedies and the depth
and rigor of economic analyses are impressive. Yet, in one sense, the very
increase in the range of contractual behaviors to be considered undermines the
usefulness of any utility analysis. For example, a rule increasing the efficiency of
the decision to perform or breach may decrease efficiencies of reliance or
precaution. Moreover, parties must make more than end-game and interim
contract decisions; they must decide about matters like price and other terms, and
even the identity of parties with whom to contract. Any of these decisions can be
made more or less efficiently. If increasing efficiency warrants the rules of
contract law,48 then the efficiency of every rule must be considered from all
points in the contracting process.49 The effect of multiple analysis points,
however, coupled with the interrelatedness of the rules, makes certainty, and thus
predictability, ever more elusive. Moreover, competing understandings of the
concept of efficiency make ultimate proof for a theory of contract remedies
almost unimaginable.0
In addition to this systemic challenge to efficiency analysis," there is a
widespread fundamental concern about the normative validity of consequentialism in
connection with contract remedies. What, after all, justifies eff 5 2conecton ithconrac edes.Wha, t al  tifesefficiency?, Even if
judicial rule-crafting increases net social utility, by what authority does the modem
state use its coercive powers to do so?" And if the state has the authority to sanction
Id.
47. Id. ("[E]nforceability can also affect each side's incentives to take various precautions that might
affect their ability to perform.").
48. For an economic critique of the determinacy of welfare analysis see TREBILCOCK, supra note 30, at
244-48 (summarizing tacit normative assumptions behind apparent precision of economic analysis).
49. See Craswell, supra note 23, at 30.
In addition, once the incentives for reliance are added into the calculus, it is possible for conflicts to
arise between the form of enforceability that would optimize the incentives to perform and the form
of enforceability that would optimize the incentive to rely. In that case the efficiency of any given
form of enforceability will depend on its combined effect on each ... so some trade-off may have to
be made ....
Id.
50. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or
Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003) ("[T]he economic approach does not explain the current system of
contract law, nor does it provide a solid basis for criticizing and reforming contract law.").
51. For consideration of other systemic problems, see SMITH, supra note 21, at 119-25 (summarizing
"fit" criticisms of efficiency theories of contract law).
52. See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 19 (2006) ("To make normative claims for efficiency, one must assume that it is good for people
to satisfy more of their preferences. Why should that be?"); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 22
(1971) (stating that utilitarianism fails as a normative theory of ethics because it does not take seriously the
distinction between persons).
53. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justification, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1773,
1777 (2007) ("Every state action, by definition, constitutes an exercise of coercion. Unlike individuals operating
within the confines of deontic constraints, the state-without exception-requires an affirmative justification
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a contract breacher, why should the aggrieved party keep the damages? 4
Deontological arguments are at least tethered to widely-accepted ethical theories;
utilitarian arguments are subject to some notorious ethical criticisms." In light of
these problems, some utilitarians abstain from offering efficiency as a norm and
merely analyze contract law intra-systemically 6  Others limit application of
efficiency analysis to contracts involving impersonal entities such as corporations to
which, presumably, deontological rules are irrelevant. In the end, the weaknesses of
a purely welfare-based explanation for expectation damages render this explanation
unable to serve the justificatory end to which many scholars of law and economics
have put it.
III. PLURALISM IN THE MARKETPLACE OF THEORY
The failure of any single theory of contract remedies to justify the practice of
protecting the expectation interest is troubling and potentially problematic.
Anyone who believes that interpretive theories of law are possible struggles
with the fundamental inconsistency of the leading competing theories of
remedies. 9 It appears there is no intelligible order in an important area of contract
law. This may not be troubling to those for whom only descriptive or historical
theories 6° are significant, but even a committed descriptivist should be concerned
for all of its actions."); see also TREBILCOCK, supra note 30, at 246 (noting that measuring welfare by Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency presupposes hypothetical, not actual, consent to a regime of efficiency-enhancing default
rules).
54. Here lies the widely debated topic of bilateralism. See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of
Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 851-59 (2007)
(describing inability of economic theory to account for bilateral nature of contract damages and resulting
problem of overreliance).
55. See SMITH, supra note 21, at 127-32 (summarizing moral objections to efficiency justifications for
contract remedies).
56. See Craswell, supra note 23, at 23.
My focus ... is not on the propriety of taking efficiency (however defined) as a goal; but merely on
the difference between assessing the efficiency (however defined) of carrying out a promised action,
on the one hand, and the efficiency of creating a broad set of incentives, on the other.
Id.
57. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541 (2003) (arguing that in the context of business contracts, "contract law should facilitate the
efforts of contracting parties to maximize the joint gains ... from transactions.... [and] nothing else"). But see
Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83
DENY. U. L. REV. 101, 103 (2005) (demonstrating that claims that non-economic theories of contract law, like
deontological ones, are irrelevant to inter-corporate transactions, "have been largely repudiated by
contemporary economic analysis," and that "contemporary law and economics explicitly assumes a model of
the corporation that is particularly hospitable" to non-economic theories of contract law).
58. See SMITH, supra note 21, at 5 (describing the focus of the book as providing an interpretive account
of contract theory that enhances "understanding of the law by highlighting its significance or meaning").
59. See Benson, supra note 12, at 118 ("In common law jurisdictions at least, there is at present no
generally accepted theory or even family of theories of contract.").
60. See SMITH, supra note 21, at 4-6 (outlining four types of contract theories: historical, prescriptive,
descriptive, and interpretive).
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that the law's credibility will be undermined if no one can provide a rational and
intelligible account of why courts do what they do.6' And, with no prospect of a
unified theory on the horizon, the incompatibility of the two leading theories-
duty and utility-threatens to unravel the marked convergence of contract law
over the last half-century. Unless scholars can generate some sort of widely-
accepted justification for contract remedies, future efforts to unify contract law
will, to paraphrase Robert Scott, cause the rules of contract law to be pitched at a
• 61
high level of abstraction with numerous exceptions. Contract law, with only the
appearance of uniformity, will turn out to be worse than inconsistent bodies of
law. With the latter, parties can rationally choose their substantive law. With the
former, parties will be subject to the unpredictable vagaries of judicial
application of formally identical, but practically different, legal standards.63
The separate deficiencies of deontological and consequential theories of
contract remedies have prompted a number of scholars to suggest that both must
somehow be combined to present a coherent whole. 64 For my purposes, I will
draw on the accounts of three writers who seek to reconcile the antinomies of
autonomy and utility. In turn, I will explain why I find these accounts
unsatisfactory. Then, I will explain my interpretive theory of how expectation
damages can be justified in terms of a specifically theistic approach that can be
called "principled pluralism., 65 I will also deal with an anticipated objection to
such an approach arising from contractualist principles of public reason.
A. Rawlsian Integration
Nathan Oman argues that John Rawls' idea of a "basic structure ' 66 provides a
means by which the ideas of autonomy and efficiency can be put into practice
simultaneously. 67 Self-imposed promissory duty is the foundation of a legal
61. See Benson, supra note 12, at 118 ("[Iln the absence of such a [comprehensive] theory, how can we
vouchsafe the internal consistency and reasonableness which the law claims for its doctrines and principles?").
62. See Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales Law, 25
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 446, 447-49 (2005) (arguing that CISG fails to provide optimal default terms because it
contains vague standards due to politicized drafting process).
63. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargaining on the Red-Eye: New Light on Contract Theory, N.Y.U. L.
& ECON. WORKING PAPERS, Paper 131 (2008), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=
l135&context=nyu/lewp (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (concluding that sophisticated parties'
regular choice of law and venue in New York, coupled with New York's formalistic approach to contract
interpretation, demonstrates the value of formalistic over contextual approaches to contract law).
64. See, e.g., Oman, supra note 54, at 834 ("[E]conomic arguments must be combined with some other
set of theories if we are to have a complete and coherent account of contract doctrine.").
65. See infra Part IV.
66. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 10 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) ("[Tlhe basic
structure of society is the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together into one
system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of
advantages that arises from social cooperation over time.").
67. Oman, supra note 54, at 834.
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regime for enforcing private contracts. 6' In turn, duty authorizes the
implementation of a consequential regime of remedial rules subject to some duty-
derived limits. 69 In Oman's understanding of Rawls, a society's basic structure is
its arrangement of major political and social institutions (civil government,
families, formal and informal associations, the structure of the economy, and the
like).7° Beginning with the premise of political liberalism,7' Rawls concluded that,
by its nature, the modern liberal state should advance both freedom and
equality.72 No single set of basic structures best advances these concerns for all
peoples, places, and times; but a polity's political institution-those
constitutionally endowed with coercive power-should seek justice (fairness)
over efficiency (welfare).73 Oman builds upon Rawls' disclaimer that his theory
of the relationship between basic structures and political institutions can provide
a basis for detailed legal rules. According to Oman, the test for determining the
precise form of political institutions "is often indeterminate: it is not always clear
which of several constitutions, or economic and social arrangements, would be
chosen" from behind the veil of ignorance.7 4 "Institutions within the permitted
range are equally just ....
Oman is content to follow Rawls' agnosticism at this point, claiming only
that the Rawlsian idea of the "basic structure" justifies the institution and abstract
principles of contract law. In turn, Oman suggests that efficiency is presumably
one of many, equally permissible, means of filling in the blanks, regardless of
any criticisms of efficiency.76 So long as there is a functioning liberal polity, it
may choose to distribute goods through private ordering by contractual
relationships. For Oman, the rules of such a private ordering can be derived from
68. Id. at 866-67.
69. Id. at 866 ("The final version of the vertical integration strategy sees the two values [autonomy and
efficiency] as operating so that one value authorizes the other value to proceed in the specification of rules
within some limited domain.").
70. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 66, at 10.
71. But see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (critiquing presuppositions of
modem political liberalism from a libertarian perspective).
72. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 52, at 266.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 201.
75. Id. (emphasis added); see also JOHN RAWLS, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in JOHN RAWLS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 254, 262 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). But see Kraus, supra note 53, at 1779 (asserting that
Rawls' conclusion was a non sequitur).
76. See Oman, supra note 54, at 866.
The Rawlsian idea of the basic structure provides an example of such a conceptual relationship.
Rawls argues for the priority of justice as he defines it. He does not, however, believe that all social
relationships must pursue the principles of justice. Rather, he says, these principles apply only to the
basic structure of a society. Once that basic structure complies with the rules of justice, society is
free to make choices that apparently conflict with demands of justice.
Id.; see also Robin Bradley Kar, Contractualism About Contract Law, LOY. L.A., Legal Stud. Paper No. 2007-
29, at 117 (2007), available at http://ssm.comlabstract=993809 ("[Rawls'] account can be read as harmonizing
contractualism with a set of contract law rules that are explicitly set up to promote efficiency.").
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efficiency. Oman thus weds deontology (as a basic structure giving priority to
autonomous promissory liability) and utility (as a subsidiary tool for identifying
efficient rules).
Jody Kraus is not willing to concede the level of indeterminacy that Oman
permits.77  Kraus draws on Rawls' later work, Political Liberalism,78  and
concludes that state coercion (including state sanctions such as the expectation
measure of damages for breach of contract) can be justified only if two
propositions hold: (1) that state action is based on public reasons 9 and (2) that
express, public, judicial reasoning in adjudication is outcome determinative.go
Thus, in Kraus' view of Rawls, the work of law and economics as a normative
project is illegitimate as a justification for private law, including contract
remedies. The good of wealth-maximization is as much a comprehensive and
unique conception of the good as Kantian individual autonomy. Rawlsian
political theory must derive from public reasons, and there is no overlapping
consensus on the good of wealth maximization.8 Thus, normative welfare
economics is unsuitable as a first-order principle of public justice: the Right
precedes the Good.
Yet, Kraus has left open the possibility that a Rawlsian theory of the
justification of private law can nonetheless incorporate much of the insights of
economics.82 His argument proceeds in three stages. First, civil authorities must
have a justifiable reason to act. In other words, public reason must support state
interest in a particular institution under a state's just constitutional arrangements.
Kraus uses road building as an example of state action justifiable by public
reasoning; authorizing a publicly supported judicial system would be another
example.83
77. See Kraus, supra note 53, at 1784 ("Any theory that falls short of identifying justifying reasons that
determine the outcomes of private law adjudication fails to justify the private law.").
78. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
79. This is understood in the Rawlsian sense as the product of overlapping consensuses, none of which
are based on a unique conception of the good.
80. Kraus, supra note 53, at 1785.
81. See Philip L. Quinn, Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious, in RELIGION AND
CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 138, 148 (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997).
Rawlsian political liberalism thus excludes the religious by drawing the boundaries of public reason
so that comprehensive religious doctrines fall outside them for the most part. But it also excludes
comprehensive secular doctrines in the same way .... Instead it privileges liberal conceptions of
justice over their rivals by including the substantive principles, guidelines of inquiry, and political
values of a liberal conception of justice ... but not those of competing, nonliberal conceptions,
within the bounds of public reason.
Id.; see also Nicholas Wolterstorff, The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues, in
RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 67, 90 (Robert Audi ed., 1997).
82. Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration
Strategy, II PHIL. ISSUES 420, 425-27 (2001).
83. Kraus, supra note 53, at 1779.
2009 / Principled Pluralism and Contract Remedies
Second, the public reasons justifying state action may determine the detailed
content of the state's actions.4 Precisely how to connect justificatory public
reasons to specific rules raises difficult questions. Does a state's authority to
create a judicial system extend to that system's adjudication of private law
matters? And, if so, how does it measure an injury to a contractual relationship in
terms of the economic value of the promisee's expectation? What degree of
certainty about its justificatory reasons does a legitimately constituted state need
before progressing to such second-order issues? The answers to these questions
are not a simple matter given Kraus' tightly drawn theory of the justification of
coercive state action.85 Contrasting the need for justificatory reasons with the
degree of their conclusiveness, however, Kraus concludes that:
In all cases... [the] state is justified in acting only on the basis of
justifying reasons that conclusively or inconclusively determine the
actions it takes. The state is therefore never at liberty to exercise
discretion in choosing among possible state actions. But ... the state can
justify its decisions without undertaking relentless and debilitating
Herculean analyses. All it must do is act in an epistemically responsible
86
manner.
In other words, an overlapping consensus favoring a system of private law does
not, as such, justify the particular rules of such a system. Nor does the mere
justification of a regime of private law justify the state's arbitrary choice of a
particular rule. Unfettered rule-making discretion is inconsistent with the idea of
justification (which is entailed by the Rawlsian version of the liberal
constitutional order). If there is no reason to prefer expectation to compensation,
or vice versa, then the state cannot act. If such were the case-and the parties
failed to specify an agreed-upon measure of damages-then no award of
damages would be legitimate. However, Kraus also believes that from a
Rawlsian perspective, a polity may proceed to specific rules, such as expectation
damages, so long as it has some reasonable basis for doing so." In other words,
Kraus' standard of legitimacy for determining rules is not unduly high.
Kraus never reaches a conclusion about the justification for a basic structure
like a judicial system with the expectation remedy for breach of contract. Rather,
he ends by noting that any justification for a private law regime, as well as its
specific rules, must run the gauntlet of political theory.88 He leaves behind a
challenge to legal theorists "to uncover the jurisprudential foundations of their
84. Id. at 1785.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
86. Kraus, supra note 53, at 1783 (emphasis added). Kraus does not elaborate on his understanding of
"epistemic responsibility."
87. Id. at 1781.
88. Id. at 1785-86.
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theories before advancing explanatory or normative claims on their behalf."' 9 The
jurisprudential claims of the leading legal theories of autonomy and utility must,
therefore, first meet the demanding criterion of being the product of an
overlapping consensus without amounting to unique conceptions of the good.
Once achieved, rule making can proceed subject only to reasonableness.
Sympathizing with Oman, but mindful of Kraus' reluctance, Robin Kar uses
both John Rawls' and T.M. Scanlon's versions of contractualism as a platform
from which to justify the expectation measure of damages. 90 For Kar's purposes,
the differences between Rawls and Scanlon are immaterial. 9' Contrary to Rawls'
refusal to extend his theory of justice "to individualized interpersonal
transactions, ' 92 Kar believes that "[Rawls'] account can be read as harmonizing
contractualism with a set of contract law rules that are explicitly set up to promote
efficiency." 93 Kar returns to Rawls' Theory of Justice94 and concludes, like Kraus,
that it is not possible to proceed directly from the existence of a liberal
95
constitutional structure to efficiency-framed rules of contract law. This is the case
because, according to Rawls' second principle of justice, "social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are... to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged. 96 And, at the very least, it has not been demonstrated that an
efficiency-dominated regime of contract law allocates economic inequalities to the
"greatest benefit of the least advantaged. 97 In addition, like Kraus, Kar rejects
Oman's simple assertion that a state may adopt whatever rules it chooses because,
under Rawls' own understanding, the principles of justice do not extend down to
the level of specific rules of private law.9
But what of the fact that efficiency seems to explain much of contemporary
private law? 99 Are we to conclude that the common law systems of property, tort,
89. Id. at 1787.
90. See Kar, supra note 76, at 133-40.
91. For a cogent discussion of contractualism in its Rawlsian and Scanlonian versions, see Elizabeth
Ashford & Tim Mulgan, Contractualism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
2007), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/contractualism (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
92. Kar, supra note 76, at 117.
93. Id.
94. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 52.
95. See Kar, supra note 76, at 121 ("These principles [of efficiency maximization] are also inconsistent
with [Rawls'] two principles of justice.").
96. Id. at 118 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 266 (rev. ed. 1999)).
97. Kar observes that Rawls' second rule of prioritization mandates equality of opportunity over
efficiency. Id. at 119. Thus, "[t]o meet this constraint, some limitations on private contracting will ...
presumably be necessary." Id. at 120.
98. Id. at 121 ("Notice that neither of these last claims [i.e., that contractualism does not apply to rules of
contract law or that contractualism authorizes efficiency-maximizing rules] can be established merely by
defining the basic structure of society in a way that leaves the rules governing private transactions out.").
99. Kar is quick to point out that efficiency cannot explain all of contract doctrine, noting in particular
that "efficiency considerations cannot .... explain why contractual remedies are owed to specific people, who
are the specific victims of the contractual breaches." Id. at 133. See generally Oman, supra note 54, at 851-59
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and contract are unjustifiable or, at best, unjustified? In a deft combination of
Stephen Darwall and John Rawls, Kar argues that a second-person contractualist
account of morality justifies not only the private law of contracts but also the
widespread-but not universal-use of efficiency as a guide to particular rules of
contract law (including expectation damages).' °° First-person accounts of
morality are similar to deontological explanations; they are the perspective
individuals adopt when asking about a rule's "capacity to govern us, rationally,
as deliberating agents."'' °  Similarly, third-person explanations for moral
obligations subsist in the perspective that "we take up when we ask questions, or
come to conclusions, the validity of which are independent both of their relations
to us and our relations to one another."'0 2 The first-person perspective reflects a
focus on individual autonomy in the Kantian tradition; third-person accounts are
similarly autonomy-based but are social rather than individual, Rawlsian instead
of Kantian. Unlike Kantian first-person accounts focusing on pure autonomous
reason, the second-person perspective on obligations is other-centered.
Moreover, unlike Rawlsian third-person accounts of moral obligations that place
a denatured self and others behind a veil of ignorance, a second-person account
of moral "ought's" takes the self and the other as they really are: "In Darwall's
view, when we make demands on one another's conduct, we are taking up the
second-person standpoint, and the legitimacy of our claims will ultimately
depend in part on whether they are justifiable to the addressees of our
demands."'0 3 In other words, obligations are not simply a specification of the
autonomously rational; nor are they the result of the collective rationality of
overlapping consensuses. Instead, obligations arise to the extent that the reasons
one proffers would be sufficient for a rational other.
Of course, no basic structure of private law could survive with a case-by-case
examination of the obligation-inducing reasons proffered by a promisee and their
sufficiency to a particular promisor. So what happens if we take Darwall's
second-person account of obligations behind Rawls' veil of ignorance and apply
the combination to the question of contract remedies?
(outlining the problem that bilateral nature of contract remedies presents for efficiency-based justifications of
private law).
100. See generally Robin Bradley Kar, Contract Law and the Second-Person Standpoint: Why
Efficiency-Maximization Principles can Neither Explain nor Justify the Expectation Damages Remedy, 40 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 977 (2007).
101. Kar, supra note 76, at 134 (quoting Robin Bradley Kar, Hart's Response to Exclusive Legal
Positivism, 95 GEO. L.J. 393, 426 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. (quoting Robin Bradley Kar, Hart's Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 GEO. L.J. 393,
426 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. at 135.
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With respect to the issue of expectation damages,'" Kar concludes that:
[Rational] people reasoning from behind the veil of ignorance would...
presumably agree to a rule that requires contracting parties to excuse one
another's non-performance in circumstances where expectation damages
are paid. This is because they would not lose anything of value by
adopting such a limitation on remedies, and because they would obtain
the ability to capitalize on new sources of increased welfare production
that arise from changed circumstances.'0 5
In other words, an inducement by one potential contracting party to the welfare-
maximizing nature of the substitutionary remedy of expectation damages and the
efficient breach would, at least in Kar's view, be persuasive to any other rational
contracting party. Given the fundamental Rawlsian conception of justice as
fairness, "[a] rule requiring parties to excuse others in these circumstances will
presumably be the price of having the right to the excuse oneself."' The other-
regarding nature of the second-person perspective thus does not rule out
considerations of utility.
B. Problems with Integration
Oman, Kraus, and Kar thus effectively build upon each other's attempts to
ground private law legal doctrine in Rawlsian or other contractualist political
theory. While each, in turn, advances the project, all of them face the weaknesses
of Rawlsian or other contractualist political theories generally. Two problems
stand out. First, no contractualist contends that there is, or has been, an actual
"contract" among the members of a polity. Contractualism is simply a heuristic
device. It assumes the givenness of a liberal democratic constitutional regime and
works within that presupposition; contractualism does not attempt to justify its
fundamental assumptions of freedom and equality. Second, contractualism and
Darwall's second-person perspective do little more than articulate the moral
intuitions of contemporary western liberalism. The arguments of contractualism
have little traction in a debate with the mandates of an illiberal ideology such as
racism. Furthermore, justifying a moral obligation by presenting an argument
with which no rational person could disagree offers an all-too-convenient "out"
in the event of an impasse: anyone who disagrees is simply not being rational.'0 7
104. Kar also believes that second-person contractualism solves the vexing problems of a purely
bilateral remedial scheme and also justifies applying coercive sanctions to breach of unrelied-upon executory
obligations. Id. at 136-38.
105. Id. at 138.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 4-5 (1991).
When we try to discover reasonable moral standards for the conduct of individuals and then try to
integrate them with fair standards for the assessment of social and political institutions, there seems
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Each of the leading contractual theories has something to offer both
descriptively and prescriptively. Autonomy suggests that contracting should be
permitted as a social practice. Utility augments social practice with law by noting
that the problems of opportunism and transaction costs can be reduced if legal
sanctions are added to the mix. Combining these theories has proved difficult, but
the efforts have been helpful nonetheless. Use of the second-person perspective
in a contractualist context certainly expands the opportunity for a political theory
that accounts for much of contemporary private law, even if it ultimately cannot
justify itself. In any event, to the extent that a Rawlsian approach to uniting
autonomy and efficiency is problematic, there are few other meta-theories in
contention.,08
IV. PRINCIPLED PLURALISM"°
I have previously described in another article a theistic framework for
analyzing contract doctrine."0 I evaluated the doctrine of consideration from three
perspectives: the normative, the situational, and the existential." In my account,
no satisfactory way of fitting the two together. They respond to opposing pressures which cause
them to break apart.
Id.; see also id. at 63 ("We can get closer [to unanimity for egalitarianism] through political institutions, but a
gap remains which can be closed only by a human transformation that seems, at the moment, utopian ....").
108. See Kar, supra note 76, at 101 ("[C]ontractualism is commonly thought of as the most promising
and robust theoretical alternative to consequentialist accounts of moral and political right."). James Gordley's
neo-scholastic revival represents a third approach to explaining, if not justifying, contract law. See generally
GORDLEY, supra note 52. Gordley argues that only in the rearticulation of Roman law in terms of Aristotelian
categories by the late Scholastics can we find a historically grounded explanation for the remedy of expectation
damages. See id. at 388-95. However, Gordley's approach to contract law and remedies has not yet had a
significant impact in the world of contract theory. For a critical review of Gordley's Aristotelian justification of
private law, see Stephen A. Smith, Troubled Foundations for Private Law, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 459
(2008).
109. The concept of "principled pluralism" is developed and applied at length in JAMES W. SKILLEN,
RECHARGING THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT: PRINCIPLED PLURALISM FOR GENUINE CIVIC COMMUNITY (1994).
As the title suggests, Skillen focused his attention on the public constitutional/legal order rather than private
law. Nonetheless, Skillen's conceptualization of the liberal order in terms of structural and confessional
pluralism is also useful when the justification of private law is considered. "Structural pluralism," according to
Skillen, "is the diversity of organizational competencies and social responsibilities" that have come to be in the
course of history of a nation (e.g., family, schools, the arts, empirical science, etc.). Id. at 83. Structural
pluralism evidences the communitarian insight that there are legitimate, free-standing social orders that exist
apart from the political state; it is not horizontally omnicompetent. "Confessional pluralism," by contrast,
presumes "that [civil] government is not competent to decide on behalf of citizens what their religious
obligations and orientations may be." Id. at 84. In other words, in neither is the state vertically omnicompetent.
Combining these two insights leads Skillen to conclude that "[civil] government's competence to establish
public justice coupled with its incompetence to define and enforce religious orthodoxy leads to a civic-moral
conclusion that there should be fair and equitable confessional pluralism." Id. (emphasis in original). In
Rawlsian terms, all comprehensive viewpoints are equal and each is free to advance its claims subject to
ordinary constitutional processes and the fundamental constraints of structural pluralism.
110. See generally Pryor, supra note 31 (analyzing and critiquing considerations from the normative,
situational, and existential perspectives).
I11. /d. at 11-19.
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the three perspectives are united by the doctrines of the law of God, ' 12 the cultural
mandate," 3 and humanity's creation in the image of God. ' 4 The law of God
obviously entails the concept of duty, but reference to the cultural mandate
orients that duty to an end, while the concept of the image of God personalizes it.
The doctrine of sin will be added to this analysis to provide further justification
for contract remedies." 5 In any event, I do not propose an alternative doctrine of
contract damages; instead, I suggest an alternative justification for a range of
alternatives including the current state of affairs. This account is explicitly
religious in the sense of appealing to concepts derived from an authoritative text.
The legitimacy of such an appeal is also considered.
A. Law, Mandate, the Image of God, and Sin
As I have described previously in more detail, divine law in the Christian
tradition has not been limited to explicit commands inscripturated in ancient
texts. 6 Not surprisingly, in the Christian tradition, explicit divine commands
have a priority over other forms of divine revelation, such as nature and
conscience." 7 But a search of the Hebrew or Christian Scriptures provides little in
the way of a specific divine warrant for a legal remedy for breach of contract. " s
112. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
115. See also David A. Skeel Jr., The Unbearable Lightness of Christian Legal Scholarship, 57 EMORY
L.J. 1471, 1509 (2008) (grounding specifically Christian theory of criminal law in scriptural doctrines of the
image of God in humanity and sin).
116. See Pryor, supra note 31, at 6-10.
Notwithstanding the primary authority of the Scripture, we may also have confidence that we can
discover God's norms for the law of contracts from sources other than the Bible. Non-biblical
sources of divine norms are frequently labeled as general revelation. God did not abandon the world
after the Fall. God the King continues His covenantal rule over His creation. Correctly interpreted,
general revelation in the forms of the testimony of the human conscience, the results of trial and
error throughout history, and the empirical sciences, such as economics, can also reveal the mind of
God on the law of contracts.
Id. at 10 (citations omitted); see also GORDON J. SPYKMAN, REFORMATIONAL THEOLOGY: A NEW PARADIGM
FOR DOING DOGMATICS 78 (1992) ("Taking Scripture seriously as Word of God leads us to recognize that there
is more to the Word of God than Scripture alone. For the Bible itself points to realities beyond itself which it
identifies as Word of God.").
117. See SPYKMAN, supra note 116, at 77 (recognizing Scripture as the source of "central criterion of
judgment" over matters of Christian faith).
118. The Covenant Code of Exodus 20:22-23:33 directed ancient Israel's authorities to provide remedies
for a variety of "properties" or commodities apart from human life. Intentional and unintentional killings,
personal injuries, as well as destruction and theft of personal property, are among the legal interests recognized
in this text. Concomitant with these legally-recognized interests are biblically authorized remedies. Notably
absent from these specified properties (and thus not explicitly protected by any authorized remedy) is the
interest created by a promise. While Leviticus deals with vows at some length, 5:4-6; 27:1-33, enjoining their
performance, prescribing cultic rules for a votary's decision to revoke a vow, and providing a monetary formula
for commutation of devoted persons and property, it does not address the social practice of contacting much less
legal remedies for breach of contract. As the biblical text covers Israel's wilderness experience in Numbers and
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Thus, a turn to the higher-level and more abstract biblical teachings regarding the
cultural mandate and humanity's creation in the image of God can be used to
justify the social practice of contracting. An additional Christian teaching about
the prevalence of sin in the world provides the final justification for coercive
civil remedies in contract law. Starting at the level of principles, however, means
that it is possible to promote varying rules for contract remedies: competing
principles can be weighed differently, different polities use different means to
accomplish the same ends, and different systems deal differently with
uncertainty. Despite this diversity, law in the Christian tradition is grounded in a
personal, transcendent reality whose will comes to bear on the created order and
those who labor in it." 9 According to Gordon Spykman:
God mandates mankind, as his "junior partners," to join him as
coworkers in carrying on the work of the world. The original creation
was good, but not yet perfect. It stood poised at the threshold of its
historical development.
.... This is where [the] cultural mandate comes in-the call to image
God's work for the world by taking up our work in the world.'2
In other words, historical and cultural development was built into a dynamic
creation, developments to which human beings were to contribute.'2 ' Moreover,
the Christian tradition generally teaches that the end or goal of human cultural
activity 12 with respect to the earth is the eschatological Sabbath rest: 23 "Genesis
Deuteronomy, there are more references to promissory obligations, but always in the context of vows. The most
extensive discussion occurs in Numbers 30, which begins with a restatement of the fundamental rules that
votaries whose offer has been accepted by divine performance must pay up, 30:1-2, after which follow some
exceptions. Deuteronomy adds nothing about contracts generally; 23:21 deals with the typical vow, not
contracts. There are of course many references in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures to inter-personal
agreements, but none of them is presented as a source of a divinely-sanctioned normative principle that there
should be such a thing as general contract law, much less what should be the remedy for breach of an ordinary
contractual relationship.
119. Pryor, supra note 31, at 111 ("[A]II human activity is 'normed' by the law of God, but the law is
not simply 'out there'; it is part of the covenantal constitution between the personal independent God and
personal dependent human beings.").
120. See SPYKMAN, supra note 116, at 256.
121. See id.
The original creation was good, but not yet perfect. It stood poised at the threshold of its historical
development .... Both structurally and directionally, everything was in a state of readiness, laden
with potentiality .... To this end God enlists the services of his imagers ... as his coworkers.
Id.
122. See Genesis 1:26-30.
Then God said, "Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness; and let them rule over
the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over the cattle and over all the earth, and over
every creeping thing that creeps on the earth." And God created man in His own image, in the image
of God He created him; male and female He created them. And God blessed them; and God said to
them, "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it; and rule over the fish of the sea and
over the birds of the sky, and over every living thing that moves on the earth." Then God said,
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 40
clearly draws a picture of all God's creating acts as teleologically directed. That
telos (end, goal, objective) is reached in the sabbath .. ,,. Likewise,
humanity's end or goal is to enter into God's rest, not as the termination of
history, but as sharing with God "in restful and delightful participation in the
wonders of his world."'25 While the word "dominion" is used in the Genesis text
mandating cultural development, the cultural mandate should not be understood
as domination or as satisfaction of subjective wants. Contemporary Christian
thinkers often use the term "stewardship" or the Anglicized Hebrew term
"shalom" when applying the concept of dominion to environmental issues. 2 6
Nonetheless, dominion is a useful term and can legitimately be understood as a
means by which humanity carries out its divine directive with regard to the
created order:
The relationship between the normative perspective of the dominion
mandate and contracts is straightforward: contracts are a means by which
human beings exercise dominion. Dominion can be distorted and become
oppressive. Contractual oppression occurs when contracts become not a
means for modeling God's independent work of creation, but a tool for
self-aggrandizement. 127
Creation of humanity in the image of God is widely taught across the various
strands of the Christian tradition.' 28 Contemporary formulations of this doctrine
"Behold, I have given you every plant yielding seed that is on the surface of all the earth, and every
tree which has fruit yielding seed; it shall be food for you; and to every beast of the earth and to
every bird of the sky and to every thing that moves on the earth which has life, I have given every
green plant for food"; and it was so.
Id.
123. See Pryor, supra note 31, at 14.
This "work of the world" was and is to move the creation (including us) to the rest into which
God entered on the seventh day of creation. Human beings were created for "rest." How was the
original goal for creation to have been accomplished? Had Adam and Eve not eaten from the tree of
the knowledge of good and evil, they ultimately would have been allowed to eat from the tree of life.
The tree of life was the preredemptive sacramental sign and seal of life, which is the permanent rest
of God into which Adam could have entered but did not.
Id. (citations omitted).
124. SPYKMAN, supra note 116. at 193.
125. Id. at 194.
126. Id. at 256-57.
Scripture speaks of exercising "dominion" over the earth and "subduing" it. Too often these words
have been cited as excuses for wantonly plundering the creational resources of land and sky and sea.
Wrongly so, however, for ours is a subservient authority, to be expressed in earthkeeping and
caretaking.
Id. at 257.
127. Pryor, supra note 31, at 15.
128. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 424-26 (1994); WESTMINSTER LARGER
CATECHISM Q&A 3-4 (1648). Catechism of the Catholic Church represents official doctrine of the largest
Christian communion. Westminster Larger Catechism is the most detailed doctrinal statement coming from the
Protestant Reformation and continues as a confessional standard in many Presbyterian denominations.
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deemphasize identifying the image of God with a particular human faculty;
instead, they emphasize that "[t]he biblical idea of imago Dei is... a relational,
referential concept. It is not to be sought in some ontic quality within us. It has
rather a dynamic, active, functional meaning."'' 9 "Image of God" encompasses
relationships-with God, with other human beings, and with the remainder of the
created order. 3 ° Humanity's reflection of the image of God not only draws
together the ideas of God's freedom, but also God's character-gracious and
sharing.'3'
Acknowledging this doctrine provides the basis for the freedom to contract as
well as for the limitations on that freedom, such as fraud, duress, and
unconscionability.'32 Human freedom to contract models God's freedom to enter
into promissory arrangements. Examples from the Torah exemplify limits on
freedom of contract under various circumstances.'33 Those limits can be
summarized by observing that life is a prerequisite to the exercise of dominion.
In turn, the goal of dominion is to enhance life and to orient it in terms of a
Sabbath rest. Writers in the Christian tradition have thus concluded that the life
enhanced through the cultural mandate should include not only our own but also
that of our neighbor.3 4 Given the division of labor inherent in the unfolding of the
129. SPYKMAN, supra note 116, at 228.
130. See id.
It [the image of God] refers to that network of religious relationships which constitutes the
framework for covenantal obedience--our relationship to God which is decisive for the normed
relationships which hold for our personal lives, for our life together in human communities, and also
for our dealings with God's other creatures great and small within the cosmos as a whole.
Id.
131. Id. ("Imaging God is doing his will.... For life is religion; religion is service; and imaging God is
serving him and our fellowmen.").
132. Pryor, supra note 31, at 34.
Creation in the image of God suggests three additional implications. First, although human
freedom in carrying out the dominion mandate is quite extensive, it is not unlimited. The covenantal
relationship with God and His laws both exemplify and put limits on human freedom. While human
beings are made in the image of the absolutely sovereign God, no humans individually (nor even
groups of human beings collectively) are totally sovereign.
Id. at 34-35.
133. The Hebrew Scriptures specifically condemn many forms of prevarication and oppression in
general terms. See, e.g., Leviticus 19:11, 13 ("You shall not steal, nor deal falsely nor lie to one another....
You shall not oppress your neighbor, nor rob him."); Deuteronomy 24:14-15 ("You shall not oppress a hired
servant who is poor and needy, whether he is one of your countrymen or one of your aliens who is in your land
in your towns. You shall give him his wages on his day before the sun sets, for he is poor and sets his heart on
it; so that he may not cry against you to the Lord and it become sin in you."). From this one can conclude that
biblical immorality includes more than theft and intentional deceit. It extends to consensual means of enriching
oneself at another's expense. See also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 128, at 579;
WESTMINSTER LARGER CATECHISM, supra note 128, at 37-39.
134. See, e.g., CALVIN: INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 408-09 (Ford Lewis Battles trans.,
John T. McNeill ed., 1967) (1559).
Now there are many kinds of thefts.... Another lies in a more concealed craftiness, when a man's
goods are snatched from him by seemingly legal means.
.... Let us remember that all those arts whereby we acquire the possessions and money of our
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cultural mandate, exchanges of goods and services between persons are
necessary for the preservation and enhancement of life. Thus, the social practice
of contracting can be justified. But there are also biblical examples of contracts
that fail to preserve and promote the goal of human life, which thus should not be
enforced.'35 The dominion aspect of the cultural mandate is cabined by the
doctrine of the image of God; autonomy is limited by justice. The trilogy of law,
mandate, and the image of God thus warrants a Christian theist to use the
concepts of duty, utility, and justice simultaneously to justify and limit the
practice of contracting. However, understanding the need for contract remedies
forces us to consider another long-standing Christian doctrine: sin.
Different Christian traditions define sin differently;3 6 yet an acknowledgment
of the breadth and depth of sin characterizes the classical analysis of the doctrine.
Sin is original; the Scriptural record traces it to the beginning of human history.1
31
Sin is radical; it affects all aspects of human existence.'38 The doctrine of sin is
relevant to contract law because, whatever the morality of contract performance
may be, a propensity toward wrongful opportunism supports state-enforced limits
on contract enforcement and sanctions for contract breach. Civil sanctions
promote the cultural mandate by rectifying breaches of dominion-enhancing
agreements. Civil limitations reduce recognition of bargains that would efface the
image of God. Moreover, not all contract breaches are a result of sin. Human
inability to know the providential contingencies of the future-and the awareness
of contract parties of their joint ignorance of those contingencies (and the human
neighbors-when such devices depart from sincere affection to a desire to cheat or in some manner
to harm-are to be considered as thefts.
id. at 409. WILLIAM AMES, CONSCIENCE WITH THE POWER AND CASES THEREOF 231-32 (Theatrum Orbis
Terrarum 1975) (1639) ("For upright meaning is required in all Contracts, and because the chiefest part of the
nature of Contracts doth consist in that, the judgment as far[] as it can appearf1, is to be[] given out of that, and
according to it. Therefore in all Contracts, we[] should proceed according to right, and good, not the letters, or
extre[me] rigour of the law, in which often times the most extre[me] injury is found."); FRANCIS TURRETIN,
INSTITUTES OF ELENCTIC THEOLOGY 123 (George Musgrave Giger trans., James T. Dennison, Jr. ed., 1994)
(1682) ("To theft belong also reductively all deceits, frauds and overreaching in contracts, measures, weights,
monies, monopolies and all evil arts and trickery by which another's property is appropriated.").
135. See supra note 133.
136. Compare CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 128, at 453, with WESTMINSTER
LARGER CATECHISM, supra note 128, at 5.
137. See Genesis 3. See generally CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 128, at 100-03;
WESTMINSTER LARGER CATECHISM, supra note 128, at 5-6.
138. While the doctrinal positions of most Christian traditions espouse some form of the radical nature
of sin, their expressions of the extent of that effect varies. Compare CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH,
supra note 128, at 102 ("[H]uman nature has not been totally corrupted: it is wounded in the natural powers
proper to it ... and inclined to sin-an inclination to evil that is called 'concupiscence."'), with WESTMINSTER
LARGER CATECHISM, supra note 128, at 5 ("The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consists in ... the
corruption of his nature, whereby he is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite unto all that is spiritually
good, and wholly inclined to all evil ...."), and id. at 5-6 ("Original sin is conveyed from our first parents unto
their posterity by natural generation, so as all that proceed from them in that way are conceived and born in
sin.").
2009 / Principled Pluralism and Contract Remedies
practice of contracting in light of awareness of that ignorance) -9-are
circumstances outside the Christian understanding of sin. Such are simply part of
the nature of being finite. Nonetheless, sin can be the efficient cause of a
promisor's breach of contract as well as the response of a promisee to a breach
induced by a non-sinful contingency. In any of these cases, a civil polity is
warranted in remedying breaches and in limiting sanctions as a means to the ends
of restful dominion and recognition of the image of God in humanity. Autonomy
and efficiency also suggest a rationale for some sort of a contract remedy, but the
transcendent justifications articulated in this section arguably do a better job than
either purely immanent theory in justifying the use of each and limiting both.
B. Prolegomena to a Transcendent Justification for Private Law
Whatever the point of departure for justification of a legal rule might be-
whether in human autonomy or efficiency, on the one hand, or in a transcendent
source, on the other-there is a concern with the idea of the origins of the
binding force of legal norms. Do legal norms advance freedom or increase
satisfaction? Or, do they reflect a design for human life ordered to a flourishing
end? Regardless of where one lies on the immanent/transcendent divide, one's
concept of the source of binding norms is guided by a conviction about the nature
of humanity itself. Are human beings distinguished by freedom, including the
freedom to bind themselves to obligations which, when breached, should be
subject to civil sanctions? Or are they characterized by individual interests, the
satisfaction of which is increased with the presence of civil sanctions? Or, do
humans exist as images of a freely creative being who reveals principles that,
when followed, contribute to a life of restful cultural activity?
The modern era has been described as a battle between nature, understood as
the relentless outworking of the laws governing matter in motion, and free-will-
the ineffable sense that human beings in some way transcend the laws of nature
and freely chart their courses in life.' 4° Efficiency justifications of law draw from
the former; autonomy-based accounts from the latter. Both are grounded in
modernity and, ultimately, neither is commensurable with the other. Efforts to
139. See generally Craig A. Stem, Crime, Moral Luck, and the Sermon on the Mount, 48 CATH. U. L.
REv. 801 (1999) (discussing the significance of the theistic concept of providence in providing consistent moral
justification for discriminating between murder and attempted murder).
140. See, e.g., HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, The Relation of the Individual and Community from a Legal
Philosophical Perspective, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 49, 51-52 (2004).
Theoretically seen, the individualistic doctrine of natural law is strongly influenced by the modem
humanistic natural science ideal. This ideal sets out to control reality by reducing complex
phenomena to their simplest elements. Its aim is to analyze these elements with the aid of exact
mathematical concepts in order to unveil the laws determining reality fully.... Civil private law is
totally different from primitive folk law. It is the product of a long development process, giving birth
to a differentiation of society. . . . Thus it becomes possible to acknowledge the rights of the
individual human being as such ....
Id.
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combine the two accounts through Rawlsian or other contractualist accounts have
not proved persuasive. 4' By contrast, post-modem thought seeks to overcome the
nature-freedom dialectic by identifying each pole as a socially constructed
version of reality. What counts as "law," and which of an infinite number of
potential desires actually animates people, are equally embedded in a social
reality whose "tilt" can be exposed only by determined critical thought.' 42 Yet
modem and post-modem modes of discourse share at least one attribute: both
look askance at any alleged transcendent justification for a legal order. For the
modernist (efficient or autonomous), religion (at least in the form of Christianity
utilized in this article) can justify itself only by an appeal to a non-empirically
verifiable reality-God. Such a God, whose revelation may justify particular
laws for human activities, is inconsistent with human autonomy.'43 A post-
modem thinker can simply relativize transcendent claims together with those of
the modernists, whether duty- or efficiency-based. In any event, modem and
post-modem thinkers would agree: transcendent truth is a throwback to pre-
modem times, whose claims to public significance led to the Wars of Religion
and mandated a secular turn in serious political thought.'"
Modem and post-modem thought alike often reject the possibility of a
transcendent justification for law in terms of what has come to be known as the
secularization thesis. The secularization thesis is expressed in various fields, but
sociological and political thought are particularly significant for my purposes.
Drawing on the work of sociologist Jos6 Casanova, Mark Modak-Truran
identifies the theory of secularization as the "'conceptualization of the process of
societal modernization as a process of functional differential and emancipation of
the secular spheres-primarily the state, the economy, and science-from the
religious sphere.""1 41 In other words, not only functional differentiation, but
141. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
142. See David S. Caudill, Disclosing Tilt: A Partial Defense of Critical Legal Studies and a
Comparative Introduction to the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, 72 IOWA L. REV. 287 (1987) (observing that
"fundamental commitments play a vital role in the construction of legal theories").
143. See Pryor, supra note 31, at 5.
We must seek knowledge in an obedient way. In the quest to know the law-including the law of
contracts-we must acknowledge our dependence and recognize that all knowledge is under
authority. Our search for the correct rules and their accurate applications is not autonomous but
rather is subject to the God whose will is revealed in Scripture (heteronymous).
id. at 5-6.
144. See, e.g., MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE MODERN WEST
(2007) (arguing that mere acknowledgment of a place for religious sentiment risks undermining modem social
cohesion achieved by the Enlightenment's gradual elimination of legitimacy of appeals to political theology).
This "Whiggish" interpretation of modem Western history is not without its critics. See, e.g., BENJAMIN J.
KAPLAN, DIVIDED BY FAITH: RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND THE PRACTICE OF TOLERATION IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE (2007) (describing social practice of religious toleration that developed in Western Europe well before
the Enlightenment).
145. Mark C. Modak-Truran, Beyond Theocracy and Secularism (Part I): Toward a New Paradigm for
Law and Religion, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 159, 185 (2007) (quoting JOSE CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE
MODERN WORLD 19 (1994)).
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"emancipation," characterizes the modem self-understanding of self-relationship
to a transcendent order. 146 A debatable description of the last 200 years of
Western history thus takes on an aura of liberation with unmistakable moral
approbation. Describing application of the secularization thesis to the law,
Modak-Truran writes:
Religion makes only subjectively rational claims and has been relegated
to the private or subjective realm by the secularization of society. Once
religious and metaphysical world views have been eliminated as a
justification for law, law must have its own independent, rational
justification. Thus, under the modem paradigm, the law is autonomous
from religion. '47
The secularization thesis faces its share of detractors. Some, like Peter Berger,
conclude that facts fail to support secularization as the trope for modernity.'
4
1
According to Berger, the compartmental separation of instrumental rationality
within life spheres from ends-oriented, non-rational thought is simply not an
accurate description of modem Western culture.149 Others, associated with the
critical legal studies movement, challenge the faith/fact, religious/empirical, and
political/rational dichotomies implicitly assumed by the proponents of the
secularization thesis. Focusing on legal indeterminacy, these scholars conclude
that all, or nearly all, legal decisions are political exercises.'50 Without law-
determined legal decisions, legal rationality collapses into an amalgam of pre-
rational but largely political, race, gender, or sexual-orientation factors. In a
146. See, e.g., LILLA, supra note 144, at 92-93.
Hobbes's overriding concern was to vanquish the Kingdom of Darkness, the vast complex of church,
state, and university that had governed European politics and consciousness for over a millennium.
To that end he developed a new science of man that purported to reveal the inner workings of
religious and political behavior and their common source in the human mind. But even when his
science was partially rejected, it still had the effect he intended: it began to reorient the theological-
political debates of Christendom away from disputes over divine revelation and toward the proper
way to control and canalize the human passions arising from claims to revelation.
Id.
147. Modak-Truran, supra note 145, at 190.
148. See Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview, in THE
DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS 2 (Peter L. Berger ed.,
1999) ("[T]he assumption that we live in a secularized world is false. The world today, with some
exceptions ... is as furiously religious as it ever was .... ).
149. Id. at 6 ("On the international religious scene, it is conservative or orthodox or traditionalist
movements that are on the rise almost everywhere."). Even the apparent exception to "desecularization"-
Western Europe-may be better understood as a "shift in the institutional location or religion," not as
secularization. Id. at 10; see also John Hare, Religion and Morality, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2006), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112008/
entries/religion-morality/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("[T]he secularization hypothesis that
religion would wither away with increasing education seems to have been false. Certainly parts of Western
Europe are less attached to traditional institutional forms of religion. But taking the world as a whole, religion
seems to be increasing in influence rather than declining as the world's educational standards improve.").
150. See generally Pierre Schlag, Politics and Denial, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135 (2001).
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purely negative critique, there is no possibility of an objective or neutral answer
to the question of the origins of the binding force of legal norms. "The emperor
has no clothes," and the only response is to acknowledge this fact.'
Autonomy and utility share one point in common: they assert that there is a
singular foundation by which the binding force of legal norms can be justified.
While their respective proponents do not agree on the identity and nature of that
foundation, each asserts that legal rules ultimately rest on one and can be
evaluated in terms of it. Borrowing from the field of epistemology, both
approaches can be characterized as examples of foundationalism.1
2
Notwithstanding the appeal of a single approach to justifying contract rules, the
incommensurability of the leading foundational perspectives,' 53 their respective
weaknesses,'5 4 and the apparent wide range of legal indeterminacy 5 ' provide
fodder for critical approaches. Critical writers, on the other hand, are anti-
foundational.' 5  They believe there is no foundational justification for the
relationship between legal rules and legal theory, and conclude that we should
replace all futile normative programs with descriptive inquiries to disclose what
social factors lead to a particular legal result.' 7
In contrast to the narrow foundationalism of autonomy or efficiency and the
anti-foundationalism of deconstructive criticism, transcendent ideas-such as the
law of God and the cultural mandate,'58 humanity's reflection of the image of
God,'5 9 and the existence of sin' 60 advanced in this article-are foundational, but
151. Modak-Truran, supra note 145, at 197 ("The deconstructive postmodem critique only insists that
'law has no foundation[.' Rather than specifying a new normative legal theory, it operates mainly as a critique
of the modern paradigm without specifying how to legitimate the law under the conditions of legal
indeterminacy."). Several postmodem legal scholars reject a purely deconstructive critique of the contemporary
legal order. Id. at 197-98. Such "constructive" postmodem efforts, which combine deep criticism with a
normative view of justice, amount to little more than traditional left-wing politics in new rhetorical garb. See,
e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 3-4 (1983) ("If the criticism
of formalism and objectivism is the first characteristic theme of leftist movements in modem legal thought, the
purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal doctrine to advance leftist aims is the second."). Like their
deconstructive counterparts, constructive postmoderns reject any return to premodern approaches. See DENNIS
PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 158 (1996) (defining postmodem thought in terms of its critique of modernity
coupled with opposition to "reverting to premodern categories").
152. See Richard Fumerton, Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2005), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fa112008/entries/justep-foundational/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("Foundationalism is a view
about the structure of justification or knowledge. The foundationalist's thesis in short is that all knowledge and
justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferential knowledge or justified belief.").
153. See supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 31-35, 48-57 and accompanying text.
155. See generally Modak-Truran, supra note 145.
156. See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
157. PATrERSON, supra note 151, at 14-17.
158. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
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broadly S0.16' That human beings are free to bind themselves by means of
promise is certainly plausible even though theories of autonomy-based ethics
ultimately justify few specific rules of contract law.' 6 Moreover, it is also the
case that the social practice of contracting enhanced by legal remedies is useful
in promoting human welfare even though unfettered utilitarianism leads to
undesirable results.'63 Neither duty nor efficiency alone can justify the remedy of
expectation damages, and neither is free from doubt as a comprehensive ethical
theory. Yet both are valuable because each has seized on one aspect of the whole
and done much to explain it. Freedom and efficiency are, in epistemological
terms, properly basic.'64 As I have previously argued, the biblical tradition
warrants a multi-perspectival approach to legal theory in which the insights of
more than a single perspective can be consistently utilized. 65 Eschewing the
single modality of autonomy or efficiency in favor of a multi-perspectival
approach grounds an explanation for the expectation remedy in a way that
permits apprehension of the values of each while justifying constraints on both.
In other words, legal vindication of the expectation interest can be justified by its
success in implementing the cultural mandate and its consistency with
promissory duty,' 66 both of which, in turn, are part of the comprehensive account
of the Christian faith.
161. Narrow foundationalism asserted that only self-evident or incorrigible beliefs could serve as the
foundation for a chain of inferences by which we can justify the much larger number of beliefs we ordinarily
hold. A problem with narrow foundationalism in epistemology is that, if correct, it would render "enormous
quantities of what we all in fact believe.. . [to be] irrational." Alvin Plantinga, Reason and Belief in God, in
FAITH AND RATIONALITY: REASON AND BELIEF IN GOD 59 (Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff eds.,
1983); see also NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS, at xi (2008).
Once upon a time, lasting until not long ago, philosophers assumed that philosophy, like religion, had
to be rationally grounded in certitudes; they understood the methodology of their discipline as
foundationalist. Never mind that rarely if ever did a piece of philosophy measure up to that
methodological demand; that was understood to be the demand.
Id.
162. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
163. See SMITH, supra note 21.
164. See DEWEY J. HOITENGA, JR., FAITH AND REASON FROM PLATO TO PLANTINGA: AN
INTRODUCTION TO REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY 177 (1991).
A basic belief is a proposition that one believes without basing it on other propositions that one
believes .... What characterizes our assent to such beliefs is the immediacy of the assent. We do not
assent to these beliefs by having first assented to other beliefs as their basis.
Id.
165. See generally Pryor, supra note 31; C. Scott Pryor, Mission Possible: A Paradigm for Analysis of
Contractual Impossibility at Regent University, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 691 (2000).
166. Several writers have recently argued that providing legal remedies for breach of contract is
inconsistent with promotion of virtue. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 34; Bagchi, supra note 35.
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C. Transcendent Justifications in a Liberal Democracy
The secular nature of the modem American civil polity suggests an
immediate objection to an approach that justifies an element of private law from
a comprehensive transcendent perspective on the human calling and human
nature. For example, attempting to provide an entirely non-transcendent
foundation for modem liberal constitutional orders, John Rawls argued in A
Theory of Justice that justice itself must be justified only on principles that
everyone in a polity can accept, thus ruling out any appeals to a comprehensive
order in a religiously plural democracy. ' However, by the time he wrote
Political Liberalism, twenty-two years later, Rawls acknowledged that a
mandatory commitment to purely secular justifications for political justice was
itself a type of "comprehensive order" that was inconsistent with the exclusion of
such comprehensive commitments from service as a resource for justifying
justice in a liberal political order.'68 Thus, Rawls later advocated that principles of
justice be determined by an overlapping consensus of all polity members. 69
Members of the polity might well have comprehensive viewpoints regarding
justice, but that would not disqualify them from serving as constituent parts of
the consensus. Whatever the consensus ultimately amounts to, however, must not
represent a commitment to any comprehensive order.
Nonetheless, as Modak-Truran points out, even with this revision "Rawls[']
legal liberalism [still] fails because it depends on a hidden (negative)
comprehensive liberal secularism (i.e., a comprehensive denial of comprehensive
convictions) that religious judges (i.e., judges recognizing the comprehensive
order of reflection) cannot accept and that leads to self-contradiction. '"'7 In other
167. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 52, at 112-17 (discussing formal constraints of the
concept of right that effectively exclude appeals to any comprehensive ordering).
168. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 78, at xvi.
Now the serious problem [with A Theory of Justice] is this. A modem democratic society is
characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines.... [that are]
the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a
constitutional democratic regime.
Id.
169. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 52, at 387.
[Wlhile the public justification of the political conception for political society depends on reasonable
comprehensive doctrines, this justification does so only in an indirect way. That is, the express
contents of these doctrines have no normative role in public justification; citizens do not look into
the content of others' doctrines, and so remain within the bounds of the political. Rather, they take
into account and give some weight to only the fact-the existence-of the reasonable overlapping
consensus itself.
Id.
170. Modak-Truran, supra note 145, at 206. "Rawls's claim [that law must be legitimated apart from
any comprehensive doctrine] entails a comprehensive denial of all comprehensive convictions (a (negative)
comprehensive liberal secularism), which according to Rawls is not possible, and thus results in an incoherent
account of the modem paradigm." Id. at 207-08; see also Michael W. McConnell, Secular Reason and the
Misguided Attempt to Exclude Religious Argument from Democratic Deliberation, I J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE 159
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words, no one who believes that his or her religion is fully comprehensive could
adjudicate (or legislate) with integrity as if it were not. That the result in a
particular case from the perspective of one who holds a comprehensive
conviction overlaps with the non-comprehensive consensus does not solve the
problem. For, as Rawls asserts, any ordering of values in adjudication or
legislation must be made in light of the overlapping consensus, not "from how
[the values] occur within citizens' comprehensive doctrines."' 7 ' No lawmaker
who holds a comprehensive viewpoint (whether transcendent or immanent,
whether religious or secular) can conscientiously serve under Rawlsian
conditions.'72 We are thus left with the unpleasant choice of admitting that Rawls
is wrong or limiting our choice of lawmakers to those who have no
comprehensive convictions. Choosing the former does not commit us to an
illiberal political order. It does, however, open the door to justifying something
similar to the contemporary liberal order on transcendent grounds.
If Rawls is wrong, what can justify a polity's application of any form of
justice? If arguably the best non-transcendent justification of the modem political
order collapses in incoherence, with what are we left? At least two possibilities
seem plausible. One alternative is acquiescing to the postmodern deconstructive
paradigm by acknowledging that no non-contingent rational principle for
justification of a legal order exists. The gap between such a concession and the
self-understandings of most lawyers and judges' 73-as well as the ongoing pursuit
of various normative ethical projects-suggests that pure criticism will not prove
satisfying.
Another possibility is to suggest a broadly foundational paradigm that
includes explicitly transcendent elements. Mark Modak-Truran pursues this when
he suggests that "providing a normative theory of law [that is] consistent with
legal indeterminacy requires a desecularization of law and a return to a religious
legitimation of law.",17 4 Modak-Truran does not mean that a polity need, or even
should, accept a single comprehensive religious understanding to legitimate its
coercive use of force in the name of law.'" In fact, he argues, a traditional
comprehensive religion cannot provide justification for law in a liberal polity
(2007) (arguing against an ideal of "public reason" that excludes religiously-motivated arguments from legal-
constitutional debates).
171. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHi. L. REV. 765, 777 (1997).
172. See Hare, supra note 149 ("It seems false that we can respect persons and at the same time tell them
to leave their fundamental commitments behind in public discourse, and it seems false also that some purely
rational component can be separated off from these competing substantive conceptions of the good.").
173. See Modak-Truran, supra note 145, at 199-201 (discussing the "ontological gap" between classical
self-understanding of law as a "working partnership between a divine author and human legislators," on one
hand, and the modem and post-modem accounts that provide no place for transcendent justification for law, on
the other).
174. Id. at231.
175. Id. ("A unitary religious (pre-modem) or secular (modem) legitimation of law appears to be an
outdated or erroneous assumption of pre-modem and modem paradigms.").
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because "[ilt fails to take religious pluralism seriously.' 7 6 For Modak-Truran,
even if a religion provides a normative basis for law and resolves questions of
legal indeterminacy, its adoption as a resource of fundamental justificatory norms
would run afoul of the Establishment and Due Process Clauses.' 77 In addition,
utilizing such comprehensive norms in judicial decision making would, as a
practical matter, "radically expand the interpretative issues involved in
subsequent litigation. Lawyers would find themselves arguing issues of
jurisprudence, theology, philosophy of religion, [and] biblical hermeneutics...
in addition to arguing the facts and the law."'' 17 One cannot help but doubt the
institutional competence of lawyers and judges in a pluralistic polity to handle
such abstruse issues.
Modak-Truran's positive paradigm posits a claim and an implication that are
relevant to deploying transcendent convictions in legal analysis. First, he stresses
that legal scholars "should critically reflect on their religious or comprehensive
convictions. The process of full justification [of a legal rule] requires critically
"'71reflecting on comprehensive convictions .... Comprehensive convictions are
important because in a liberal polity, the law cannot justify itself; there must be a
reason why the law is as it is and that reason requires recourse to a principle more
comprehensive than the facticity of a particular legal rule.'80 As established in
Part II above, autonomy and efficiency are the comprehensive convictions
commonly offered to justify the expectation measure of damages. But, as
demonstrated in Part III, neither autonomy nor efficiency has succeeded in
providing a coherent comprehensive justification for this rule. Turning to the
cultural mandate, the image of God and sin, I have suggested that we find three
doctrines subsisting as part of a larger transcendent comprehensive conviction
concerning human nature and the human calling that can justify the expectation
measure of damages. However, does use of such doctrines violate the constitutive
norms of a religiously plural democratic society? Part III above suggests a
negative answer in light of my claims that application of the purely immanent
theories of justice of Rawls and Scanlon are ultimately incoherent. If these
leading explanations fail, is not recourse to a transcendent explanation at least
plausible?
More directly, the argument against explicit judicial employment of
comprehensive convictions leaves open the use of such convictions when doing
legal theory. Modak-Truran develops a lengthy argument that judges cannot help
but employ comprehensive convictions when resolving "hard" cases (i.e., cases
176. Id.
177. See generally Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial
Decision Making, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 709 (2004).
178. Id. at 791.
179. Id. at 738.
180. See, e.g., H. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (criticizing positivistic accounts of law for
failing to consider the internal as well as external nature of law).
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where existing legal norms are unclear or conflicting).'"' These comprehensive
convictions may be transcendent or immanent, but all function in a broadly
foundational way to direct judicial discretion when the law fails to do so. If we
understand religion broadly to be "the primary form of culture in terms of which
we human beings explicitly ask and answer the existential question of the
meaning of ultimate reality for us,' 8 2 then both transcendent and immanent
approaches are equally religious and each may legitimately be employed to
evaluate, critique, and ultimately justify contemporary legal rules.
Comprehensive convictions, including traditionally-understood religious ones,
lead to comprehensive theories. Such theories are integrative; that is, they are
advanced and evaluated by how well they enable persons to make sense of the
world as a whole. Judges and legislators in the United States need not refer
explicitly to such comprehensive convictions for the reasons noted above.'83
Indeed, historically, the common law has functioned at a "middle level" mode of
legal analysis. 84 Theory need only justify the practice of law, not its
particularities. In this account, I have sought to provide a transcendent
justification for the expectation measure of damages; I have not sought to show
that a legal system demands it.
V. CONCLUSION
Since 1936, legal scholars have dug deeply into the justification for
measuring damages for breach of contract by the value of the disappointed
expectation rather than the harms caused by a breach; gains prevented as well as
losses incurred. Of the two leading explanatory theories of contract law, only
efficiency has proved fine-grained enough to provide specific reasons for the
expectation measure. Yet its leading competitor, autonomy, does a better job of
justifying moral foundations of contracting. Efforts to combine autonomy and
181. See Modak-Truran, supra note 177, at 732-34.
In hard cases, judges must rely on extra-legal norms because hard cases are, by definition, those
cases in which the relevant legal norms do not provide a determinate outcome to the dispute in
question....
To provide this full justification, my religionist-separationist model maintains that judges ought
to rely on religious convictions in their deliberations about hard cases to justify the extra-legal norms
required to decide those cases.
Id. at 732-33.
182. Id. at 723 (quoting SCHUBERT M. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE TRUE RELIGION OR ARE THERE
MANY? 5 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted); see also WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 161, at x ("[Pihilosophy
speaks of how every thing, in the most general sense of 'thing,' hangs together, in the most general sense of
'hangs together.' If one believes in God, then not to bring God into the picture, when relevant, is to defect from
the philosopher's calling.").
183. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
184. See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part IH), 3 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1, 6 (2003) ("[T]he [common] law is to be found in the accumulated experience recorded
in the books and memories of common law jurists, not in any theory, or articulation of this experience. Law is
practice, not a theoretical representation of it.").
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efficiency in terms of modem contractarian theories of political liberalism have
not yet succeeded. Moreover, the very comprehensiveness of autonomy- or
efficiency-based accounts makes the primacy of either in the typical contractarian
accounts of pluralist political legitimacy questionable.
This article suggests that several doctrines that are widely accepted within
the Christian tradition provide a platform on which autonomy and efficiency,
limited but justified, can rest. Humanity's reflection of the image of God and
cultural activity oriented toward consummate rest are both drawn from Torah-
teaching or law. Thus, both are examples of a wide number of foundational
concepts that, in the Christian account, are grounded in a transcendent reality.
Promise-keeping is an aspect of the cultural mandate, but that mandate-unlike
efficiency's emphasis on preference satisfaction-is not an end in itself. Rather,
the goal of human cultural activity-including contracting-is the eschatological
rest in which humanity's reflection of God is ultimately realized. Coupled with a
robust doctrine of sin that recognizes the pervasive postlapsarian reality of
opportunism, I believe the legitimacy of expectation damages can be justified.
Obviously, such a Christian theistic justification is part of a larger comprehensive
account which, in a Rawlsian understanding of liberalism, is unacceptable in a
pluralistic polity. Yet, because the belief that all comprehensive convictions are
out of place is itself a comprehensive conviction, I must part ways with Rawls. I
conclude that liberalism requires only a commitment to a liberal political order
and does not exclude any motivations or arguments-regardless of their source-
from the public sphere. There is no supra-political trump card by which an appeal
to a comprehensive conviction can be ruled out.
My goal has been to show that a transcendent, in my case specifically
Christian, account can justify the social practice of contracting as well as a legal
regime in which the expectation measure of damages can be used. It also
suggests that limits on legal remedies for certain contracts can be justified. In any
event, I believe I have also shown that such a theory represents no greater threat
to the religiously plural nature of contemporary liberal polities than unfettered
autonomy or efficiency. It is neither necessary nor even desirable for judges or
legislators to expressly utilize this or any other theory. It is nonetheless useful at
the level of theory to have a broadly foundational but transcendently justified
basis to explain why courts are justified in doing what they do.
